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1. Introduction
In the 1950s, Mexico and a number of other Latin American
countries opted for a strategy of inward-oriented development
aimed at accelerating the pace of industrialization. This stra-
tegy relied heavily on a process of import substitution brought
about by creating a protected domestic environment biased in
favor of the modern manufacturing sectors. By the early 1960s, it
was already becoming clear to many observers that import sub-
stitution policies were not delivering all they had promised, but
rather provided a hindrance to development (Hirschman, 1968).
Nevertheless, Mexico continued to pursue a highly protectionist
course in subsequent years; see Balassa (1983).
A tendency toward increasingly protectionist policies has
also been observed over the last decade in the industrialized
countries. While the policymakers in question often proclaim
their continued allegiance to free trade maxims, protectionist
actions are nonetheless taken and defended as merely transient
measures to ease adjustment burdens occasioned by structural
changes at home or to counter unfair trading practices abroad. In
developing countries, or semi-industrialized economies such as
the Mexican, infant industry arguments usually constitute the
official basis for trade intervention. It is claimed that satis-
factory growth can only be attained through the planned pro-
tection of certain strategic industries; for otherwise, the eco-
nomy would be fated to remain in the secondary role of a raw
materials supplier to the already developed economies. The
question addressed in this essay is whether the same factors- 2 -
found useful in explaining industry protection patterns in devel-
oped economies also help to explain protection patterns in a
developing economy, exemplified by Mexico, in spite of the dif-
ferences in official rhetoric.
An underlying premise in the rapidly expanding literature on
the political economy of protection (Bhagwati, 1982; Frey, 1984)
is that the structure of trade barriers in an economy reflects a
set of political bargains struck in the market for protection.
This literature explicitly recognizes that in most instances of
government intervention the costs and benefits attached to parti-
cular measures are generally not equally distributed across so-
ciety. Rather, some members gain at the expense of others, which
gives agents an incentive to further their economic interests
through political action, seeking to sway politicians into adopt-
ing policies to their favor. In turn, politicians are regarded as
entrepreneurs that supply protection to the highest bidders.
Using this perspective, a widely pursued research objective has
been to determine whether or not there exists a systematic pat-
tern in the structure of protection, to identify which economic
groups have been most successful in obtaining protection and to
distinguish particular aspects of the political environment that
may have encouraged that outcome.
Anderson and Baldwin (1981) provide an extensive list of
factors and industry characteristics which previous studies have
pointed out as potentially significant in determining patterns of
industry protection. Their survey of empirical findings obtained
for various industrialized countries reveals that in general it
is the low-wage, labor-intensive, low value-added, declining- 3 -
industries, facing strong import competition and employing large
numbers of workers, who receive the most effective protection.
What this essay seeks to explore next is to what extent the
structure of protection in Mexico displays a similar pattern, and
also how that structure has evolved, if at all, over time. A
central issue is whether the political market paradigm described
before can also be usefully applied to Mexico, even though the
political system and channels through which protection is gene-
rated differ considerably from the pluralist political systems
existing in the Western industrialized countries.- 4 -
2. The determinants of industry protection in Mexico
To determine whether Mexican protection policy exhibits a
systematic pattern, two measures of sectoral protection are re-
gressed on various industry characteristics using cross-section
data for the years I960, 1970 and 1980. The list of explanatory
characteristics consists of those variables which have received
the most attention and appear most significant in previous re-
lated work that primarily concentrated on the industrialized
countries. They are:
1) NOW, the number of workers occupied in an industry;
2) LSH, the labor income share of value added;
3) AW, the average wage paid in an industry (total wage
bill divided by NOW);
4) VAR, the ratio of value added to total sales;
5) IMR, the ratio of imports to total sales;
6) EXR, the ratio of exports to total sales;
7) RC70, a measure of regional concentration of an in-
dustry, calculated for the year 1970.
Except for RC70, figures for these variables have been obtained
for 1960, 1970 and 1980.
1
The primary data on sectoral protection levels has been
taken from Bueno (1971) for the year 1960, from Kate and Wallace
(1980) for the year 1970, and from a most recent study sponsored
by IMCE (1984), which provides figures on protection for the
years 1979-1981. Protectionist policy in Mexico relies mainly on
non-tariff barriers, through import quotas and licensing. Tariffs
play a minor role, by Latin American standards, and therefore do- 5 -
not adequately reflect the true levels of protection granted. Two
alternative measures of protection, designed to capture both the
effects of tariff and non-tariff barriers, are provided in the
studies mentioned above. These are the rates of nominal implicit
protection and of effective protection. Nominal implicit pro-
tection (NP) is defined as the percentage difference between
domestic and foreign prices of a product. It reflects, not the
amount of protection offered, but the amount domestic suppliers
have chosen to exploit. Alternatively, effective protection (EP)
is the percentage difference between the value-added generated in
an industry using domestic prices and using foreign prices. This
measure nets out the disprotection to an industry that results
when intermediate inputs have to be purchased above world market
prices, and therefore indicates more accurately the true rents
2
captured by an industry. Those figures have been calculated
using the most recent input-output tables for the years in
question.
The estimation results are shown in Table 1 and 2, using
nominal protection rates and effective protection rates as the
dependent variable. For each year, two sets of values are re-
corded: Pertaining to 1960 and 1970, the first column (a) pre-
sents the results for which the best fit was obtained in terms of
_2
the adjusted coefficient of determination, R , using a sequential
SPSS search routine. Column (b) reports the results using all
exogenous variable. For the year 1980, columns (a) and (b) re-
present separate regressions using non-overlapping exogenous
variables. This procedure was necessary because of data con-
straints. In some cases data was only available in 35-sector- 6 -
disaggregated form, while in the other case it appears in 59-
sector form. Although that procedure raises potential problems in
the interpretation of the results, those do not play a crucial
role in these particular experiments. Also, for 1970, an adjust-
ment in the estimation procedure was made to account for a high
collinearity between the independent variables, LSH and AW. All
estimations were made using a regression constant whose value is
not shown.
Before addressing the results, some comments are necessary
with respect to the data sample employed. Appropriately disaggre-
gated employment and wage data for the agricultural sectors (in-
cluding livestock, fisheries and forestry) was not available
prior to 1980. This meant that in most regressions for 1960 and
1970, these four industries had to be excluded from the data
sample. (For 1980, however, such data was available and included
in the regressions.) Furthermore, in the regressions involving
effective protection (Table 2) a few additional industries are
excluded from the data sample because of some extreme outlier
values recorded for the effective protection rates. For 1960, the
Meat and Milk products (195.7) and Automobiles (254.7) industries
are excluded; the figures in parentheses refer to the recorded
effective protection rate 7 In contrast, the mean and standard
deviation of the effective protection rate sample in that year,
EP60, are 34.2 and 28.7. For 1970, the mean and standard de-
viation of EP70 are 50.0 and 62.1, and the industry excluded is
Fertilizers + Insecticides (1026.4). Finally, the mean and stan-
dard deviation of EP80 are 39.0 and 52.5, and the excluded in-
dustries are Synthetic Fibres (824.0) and Automobiles (-868.8).- 7 -
The main effect of excluding these industries from the relevant
regressions was to bring about a fairly significant improvement


































































Numbers in parentheses refer to the t-values of the coefficients. The asterisk (*) indicates significance at the

































































Numbers in parentheses refer to the t-values of the coefficients. An asterisk (*) indicates significance at the 10%
level.- 8 -
3. Discussion of the empirical results
The sign values obtained in the regressions pertaining to
nominal protection (Table 1) largely conform with the results
reported in Anderson and Baldwin (1981) for the industrialized
countries. The labor share of income (LSH) consistently attains a
positive sign, while the average wage level (AW) usually appears
with a negative sign. Their ratio (AW/LSH) represents the labor
productivity of an industry. Assuming that labor productivity is
positively related to an industry's capital-labor ratio, it would
follow that the more labor-intensive industries receive higher
protection. Furthermore, the import-ratio (IMR) attains a posi-
tive sign in the regressions, while the export-ratio (EXR) and
the ratio of value-added to gross sales (VAR) always attain nega-
tive signs. The only departure from the pattern observed in the
industrialized countries is given by (NOW),, the number of workers
employed, which attains a negative sign, although with varying
significance.
A more diffuse picture emerges from the regressions in Table
2, involving effective protection. Nonetheless, the sign patterns
are approximately the same as those obtained in the corresponding
regressions using nominal protection. In the few instances where
conflicting signs appear, the coefficients are statistically
insignificant.
Overall, these results contradict the notion that developing
countries behave much differently than the industrialized coun-
tries in terms of who is granted protection. One received notion,
in particular, appears to be that whereas industrialized coun-- 9 -
tries generally protect labor-intensive declining industries,
developing countries tend to protect more capital-intensive mo-
dern manufactures, so that both are responsible for upsetting
traditional comparative advantage relationships. Admittedly, a
considerable amount of casual evidence seems to support this
idea, in addition to having a certain, intellectually appealing
symmetry to it. However, the data for Mexico, at least, does not
seem to support this view as a general rule.
Perhaps the more striking observation concerns the explana-
tory value of the regressions. It may be interesting to note that
2
the R values reported in Table 1 remain fairly constant across
different periods, in contrast to the values in Table 2. Further-
more, in 1960 and 1980, a considerably better fit is obtained
using nominal protection rates than when effective rates are used
_2
as dependent variables. With nominal rates, the best R obtained
is 0.27 and 0.43, whereas the corresponding values with effective
rates are only 0.14 and 0.12. In 1970, that result is reversed,
however. Although a fairly respectable fit is found using nominal
_2
rates (R = 0.40), effective rates yielded even better results
(R
2 = 0.58) .
4
These last results for 1960 and 1980 are surprising from the
theoretical viewpoint that relative protection levels are deter-
mined by demand and supply in a political market dominated by
rational agents. One would conjecture these agents to be mainly
concerned with the net benefits of protection (i.e., effective
rates), and not with the gross rates reflected in nominal rates.
A different interpretation of Mexican protectionist policy would
find those results less surprising. This is that protection is- 10
consciously granted by central planners, with a deliberate devel-
opment strategy in mind, but who have mistakenly chosen nominal
rates as instruments without realizing that it is effective rates
which have the real impact on resource allocation. The problem
with that interpretation is- that it cannot account for the ap-
parently rational focus on effective rates in 1970, before the
relapse into a wrong emphasis on nominal rates once again took
place in 1980.
In a similar endeavor pertaining to the United States, Cheh
(1974) investigated the changes in protection levels between 1964
and 1972 following from the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations,
and also arrived at the result that nominal protection rates
yield a substantially better fitting equation than effective
rates. He explains this result by arguing that nominal rates are
the direct bargaining focus during actual tariff negotiations,
and therefore reflect more accurately the distribution of politi-
cal power among competing pressure groups. This argument is not
supported by Riedel (1977) , who conducts an identical experiment
using German data and finds that effective rates outperform nomi-
nal rates. Nonetheless, there may be some truth to Cheh's argu-
ment when applied in the context of a particular negotiating
round. Individual groups might lack enough information about the
other rates being simultaneously negotiated, or cannot accurately
gauge the total impact of changes made, taking into account all
the input-output linkages, until the new structure actually takes
effect. Those arguments appear less plausible in the present
investigation, however, since it considers levels and not changes
in protection. Moreover, Mexico is not a member of GATT so that-li-
the ability of policymakers to maneuver in response to new pro-
tectionist demands, after the effective impact of any given re-
vision in protection rates has been felt, is considerably less
constrained.
Another reason for the comparatively low significance of the
regressions using effective protection rates in 1960 and 1980
could be that the wrong independent variables were chosen to
explain EP. But then it seems unlikely that the regressions in-
volving NP would have turned out as well as they did. Also, one
could mention the possibility that the results might have been
distorted through erroneous data caused by inaccuracies in the
input-output tables used to calculate EP.
Finally, a different and possibly more compelling explana-
tion for the previous results is that the market for protection
in Mexico might not be functioning efficiently. That is, policy-
makers may be reacting in an appeasing manner to demands by
constituents seeking protection (as witnessed in the results
using nominal protection), but the political process is not suf-
ficiently competitive to discipline those policymakers into re-
sponding more effectively to those demands except in special
circumstances. In contrast to the multi-party system that cha-
racterizes the industrialized nations surveyed in Anderson and
Baldwin, Mexico is, in effect, a one-party state with political
power highly concentrated at the top in the office of the Presi-
dent, and with lesser offices generally filled by appointment
rather than direct representation. Mexico's ruling party, the
Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI), coalesced during the
revolutionary period in the early part of this century and re-- 12 -
mains virtually unchallenged to this day. While the president can
only remain in office for one six-year term, his designated suc-
cessor has so far always been chosen, in elections that primarily
serve a "legitimizing" function. One likely consequence of mono-
poly power, given by such a highly centralized political struc-
ture, is a reduced flexibility in the response to demands. Using
this monopoly argument to serve as a basis for interpreting pro-
tection patterns in Mexico, then raises the question of what
induced the suppliers of protection to suddently become more
responsive in 1970, when a more pronounced pattern in effective
rates is observed. Before suggesting an answer, it may be worth-
while to briefly consider an additional piece of evidence.
Further evidence of a systematic pattern in protection can
be obtained by regressing the structures of industry protection
in different years against each other. These regression results
are shown in Table 3. In view of the monopoly position enjoyed by
the PRI in Mexican politics, and assuming that the configuration
of interest groups seeking protection within party channels does
not change drastically over time, one would expect to observe a
certain continuity in the structure of protection. Table 3 sup-
ports that conjecture, most prominently in the case of nominal
protection rates. In all three years considered, the structures
of nominal protection are positively and significantly corre-
lated. The structures of effective rates are also positively
correlated, but not always significantly. These results, in other
words, also point toward a deliberate design in the determination
of nominal protection, becoming less pronounced in the case of
effective protection. More interesting, however, is the fact thatTable 3: The relation between industry protection rates in Mexico over
different years
I. The relation between nominal rates
1) NP70 = 6.67 + 0.539 NP60 R
2 = .18 T = 35
(2.69)* 0
2) NP80 = -0.44 + O.660 NP70 R = .20 T = 35
(2.88)*
3) NP80 = -10.23 + 1.069 NP60 R = .32 T = 35
(3.95)*
II. The relation between effective rates





2) EP80 = 30.04 + 0.337 EP70 R^ = .10 T = 32
3) EP80 = 5.95 + 1.027 EP60 R
2 = .34 T = 32
(3.91)*
Numbers in parentheses are t-values. NP60 denotes the level of
nominal protection in year 1960, while EP60 denotes the corre-
sponding level of efective protection. The same notation applies
also for the years 1970 and 1980. The industry protection figures
for 1980 were originally available in a 59-sector disaggregated
form. They were aggregated into 35-sector form using value-added
shares as weights. The sample used for the regressions involving
effective rates excludes the same outliers discussed in section 2.dss
iafS K!@g
- 13 -
the protection structure in 1980 is considerably closer to the
structure prevailing in 1960, than either structures are related
to that existing in the intervening year of 1970. This applies to
both nominal and effective protection. Observe in Table 3 that
equations (1.3) and (II.3)- register the highest R values and
9
coefficients near 1. That result, combined with the changing R
patterns observed in Tables 1 and 2, suggests the occurrence of a
temporary change in emphasis among Mexican policymakers around
1970 in terms of granting protectionist favors. In this respect,
it may be useful to point put two important developments prior to
1970 which might explain this observation.
After 1954, the Mexican economy embarked on a course that
retrospectively became known as the period of "stabilized
growth". During that period, there occurred a rapid urban and
regional concentration of the population, which was partly in-
duced by the import-substitution policies adopted. The share of
employment in the stagnating agricultural sector declined from
50% in 1960 to 40% in 1970, while the growing industrial activity
became primarily centered around the cities of Monterrey, Guada-
lajara and Mexico City (Fischer, Gerken, Hiemenz, 1979). Second-
ly, despite increases in the minimum wage (Amparo Casar, Marquez,
1983) , an increased disparity of income distribution took place,
most noticeably reflected in a decline of the relative shares
received by the poorest third of the population (Gallardo, 1983;
Rovzar, 1983) . This combination of urban overcrowding and declin-
ing income shares received by the poorer segments of society made
for an incendiary mixture, most visibly manifested by the student
disturbances of 1968 (Soils, 1981). Although these uprisings were- 14 -
quickly suppressed, they appear to have left an imprint on the
policymakers
1 consciousness. By 1970, with the coming into power
of the Echeverria administration, social inequities became offi-
cially recognized as a target of policy, in what was heralded to
be a new age of "shared growth". The results in Tables 1 and 2
reflect a policy reorientation in response to those pressures:
The NOW coefficient changes from a fairly significant negative
value in 1960 to a positive (or insignificant) value in 1970, and
the regional concentration (RC70) coefficient becomes increasing-
ly significant in 1970. Furthermore, a remarkable increase in the
explanatory value of the regressions is observed, as previously
mentioned, especially in the case of effective rates. Both sug-
gest an increased effort to placate the demands of urban labor
that provided the greatest potential for social unrest.
This policy reorientation around 1970 did not last long,
however. The spectacular oil discoveries in the mid-1970s cata-
pulted Mexico, once again, among the top oil-producing nations,
and appeared to signal an end to previous economic difficulties.
Pressures to implement further policy reforms consequently
abated, allowing the previous status quo to reassert itself;
which may explain the reappearance of a protection pattern in
1980 similar to that existing in 1960.- 15 -
4. Summary
The preceding investigation shows that the structure of
industry protection in Mexico, when measured by nominal rates,
displays a systematic pattern quite similar to that which has
been observed in the industrialized countries. This would suggest
that the basic motives for granting protection are the same in
both instances, despite differences in political environments and
in official rhetoric defending protectionist measures. With re-
spect to effective protection rates, however, it becomes somewhat
more difficult to discern a systematic pattern, even though eco-
nomic reasoning tells us that it is effective rates which pri-
marily matter in the allocation of resources and factor returns
and thus should be the focus of protectionist demands and supply.
One explanation suggested above for the divergent empirical re-
sults emphasizes some monopoly traits present in the Mexican
party system. That is, the observed pattern in nominal rates
gives evidence of some intent to further the interests of parti-
cular protection-seeking clienteles. But the amount of compe-
tition between parties representing different constituents
1 de-
mands has been too small to elicit a more effective response from
the suppliers of protection, except in crisis situations.- 16 -
Footnotes
Figures on the average number of workers employed (NOW) and
total wages- paid are published by the Secretaria de Pro-
gramacion y Presupuesto, Manual de Estadlsticas Basicas. For
1960 and 1970, however, these figures came disaggregated at
the 4-digit level and had to be aggregated to a 2-digit
level, for which I used the key provided by the Secretaria
de Patrimonio y Fomento Industrial, Tablas de Insumo-Pro-
ducto. Also, these earlier figures do not include the agri-
cultural sectors. Figures on value-added per industry (VA) ,
exports (EXP), and imports (IMP) are provided by the Banco
de Mexico, Informe Anual, while gross sales are published by
the same office at irregular intervals. The variable RC70,
as well as sectoral export and import figures for 1960 and
1970, were taken from Kate and Wallace (1980). Sometime in
the late 1970's, industrial statistics appear disaggregated
at a 59-sector level, not including services; previously a
35-sector disaggregation was used.
2
The idea behind these separate measures is identical to that
which distinguishes ordinary nominal and effective tariff
protection as discussed in Balassa (1965) and Corden (1966) .
These results have to be qualified in one important respect,
given that the agricultural sectors were omitted from the
regressions for 1960 and 1970. Even though these industries
are among the most labor-intensive, they received signifi-- 17 -
cant disprotection over those years, suggesting that perhaps
agriculture be treated as a separate case in the Mexican
market for protection.
_2
The values of R reported in the studies surveyed by Ander-
son and Baldwin (1981) ranged between 0.2 and 0.5; i.e.,
comparable to the values obtained here.
There are also some methodological, econometric problems to
consider. The first is simultaneity bias: If the political
market analogy is taken seriously, then ' it is unclear
whether what is being estimated here is a demand or supply
curve for protection. All that can be said is that the re-
gressions reflect a particular outcome in the market for
protection, favoring certain industry characteristics. Se-
condly, there is a related problem that the exogenous va-
riables may in turn be functions of the endogenous variable.
For example, if export-oriented industries are effectively
disadvantaged by protection, they are likely to decline,
switch toward the domestic market and export less. Similar-
ly, if small firms (in terms of NOW) were systematically
advantaged by protection, they would have grown and large
ones declined. In both examples, the estimated coefficient
would be biased downward from the true coefficient. This
last problem, however, should not be so serious in the esti-
mations involving nominal protection rates, since economic
theory tells us that it is effective rates which have a real
effect on profitability and factor returns.- 18 -
I am not attaching any normative content to the notion of
efficiency in this case. A well-known proposition in pure
trade theory is that unfettered free trade is best. Hence,
if particular politically active groups are able to extract
protection for themselves, as they arguably would in an
efficiently functioning political market, their gain is
offset by an even greater aggregate welfare loss. In a simi-
lar context, Bhagwati (1985, ch. 1) also notes the paradoxi-
cal situation that it may well be the most authoritarian
regimes that are in the best position to adopt more welfare
enhancing, outward-oriented policies.- 19 -
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